This paper addresses con ‡icting results regarding the optimal taxation of capital income. Judd (1985) proves that in steady state there should be no taxation of capital income. Lansing (1999) studies a logarithmic example of one of Judd's models and …nds that the optimal steady state tax on capital income is not always zero -it is positive in some speci…cations, negative in some others. There appears to be a contradiction.
Introduction
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) prove that capital income should not be taxed in a steady state. Lansing (1999) provides a counterexample to this result. The example is particularly intriguing since it is a special case of one of Judd's models. There appears to be a contradiction. Lansing o¤ers explanations to reconcile the di¤erences. He also considers extensions of the model that revive the zero tax result. However, one is still left wondering what goes wrong in the counterexample. Lansing states on page 449, "Future research should be directed at developing a solution method that gives the right answer in all cases." Judd's solution method is optimal control theory (as is Lansing's). It would be very troubling indeed if optimal control theory failed to give the right answer. Fortunately, the contradiction can be resolved: Judd and Lansing have proved two di¤erent theorems with two di¤erent sets of hypotheses. For the special case with logarithmic utility that Lansing considers, his theorem's hypotheses are less restrictive than Judd's so the range of possible outcomes is wider. In particular, Judd's zero capital tax result is one possible outcome, but not the only one.
The hypotheses in question deal with the convergence properties of various co-state variables (Lagrange multipliers). Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) have also observed that the convergence hypotheses of Judd's theorem might not be satis…ed. Among the possibilities is that the steady state of the economy could be completely unstable in which case the zero capital tax result may not apply. In Lansing's example it turns out that there is a somewhat di¤erent reason why Judd's result does not apply. The issue is not the local dynamics about the steady state, but rather the dynamical system might not even have a steady state.
Further work regarding the convergence properties has been done by Straub and Werning (2015) . They state, "Reinhorn . . . correctly clari…ed that in the logarithmic case the Lagrange multipliers explode, explaining the di¤erence in results" between Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999) . Straub and Werning (2015) also state, " [W] e believe the issue can be framed exactly as Reinhorn . . . did, emphasizing the non convergence of multipliers."
Since the co-state variables/multipliers are shadow prices that are not observable, one would rather not make assumptions about their behavior. On the other hand, it is quite reasonable to assume that observable macroeconomic variables have stable long run behavior since this is consistent with most developed economies. (E.g., page 304 of Lucas 1990 for the US.) In the case of Judd's model, which abstracts from demographics and technological change, stability boils down to convergence to an interior steady state. Thus, I study the behavior of the optimal tax on capital income, assuming only that the observable macro variables converge to positive limits, with no assumptions about co-states. 1 I …nd that there are only two possible outcomes: either the modi…ed golden rule holds in the limit or else savings are insensitive to the after-tax interest rate in the limit. In the former case we get Judd's zero tax result. In the latter case, the income and substitution e¤ects of an interest rate change just cancel, and this is what occurs in Lansing's example with logarithmic utility. If interest does not a¤ect savings, this undermines the bene…t from a zero tax on interest/capital income and we can see why Judd's result does not necessarily hold in this case. Straub and Werning (2015) raise serious concerns about Judd's convergence hypotheses in the case where the capitalist in the model has CES utility. In particular, when the capitalist's intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, the solution to the optimal tax problem cannot converge to an interior steady state. If, in addition, the social welfare function places zero weight on the capitalist and all weight on the worker, then the solution to the optimal tax problem does converge, but to a non-interior steady state with a positive tax rate on capital income. Straub and Werning conclude that Judd's model cannot be used to unequivocally justify a zero long run tax on capital income. I agree with Straub and Werning. But since the CES case with elasticity less than one leads to a non-interior steady state, and since this is inconsistent with stable long run behavior, I prefer to exclude these utility functions from consideration and instead focus on utility functions (and other primitives) that do lead to stable long run behavior.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the theorems of Judd and Lansing, explains the relationship between these two theorems, and also provides the general result described above. Section 4 o¤ers a concluding comment.
Model
The model has four economic actors: capitalist, worker, …rm, government. The capitalist has access to the capital market but does no work. The worker supplies labor inelastically but does not have access to the capital market. The …rm is a price taking pro…t maximizer that uses capital and labor to produce output.
The government chooses a time path for the tax rate on capital income and uses the proceeds to provide lump sum transfers to the worker. There is no government debt. Hence the transfers must equal the taxes at each point in time. We now proceed to describe the model in detail.
The capitalist has an in…nite horizon and maximizes discounted utility,
where > 0 is the subjective discount rate and c c t 0 is instantaneous consumption. The superscript identi…es the capitalist; c w t will be the worker's consumption. The instantaneous utility function u is smooth, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es Inada conditions. At the beginning of time the capitalist's wealth consists of the economy's entire stock of capital, k 0 > 0. This stock of wealth/capital evolves through time according to the capital accumulation equation:
where kt is the tax rate on net capital income (subsidy rate if negative), r t is the pre-tax interest rate gross of depreciation, and is the depreciation rate. Note the lack of wage income which re ‡ects the assumption that the capitalist supplies no labor. For ease of notation, let r t := (1 kt )(r t ) denote the after tax, net of depreciation, interest rate. 2 At the solution, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution must equal the ratio of present value prices, and the budget must hold with equality:
Equivalently, the …rst of these conditions can be log di¤erentiated to give the consumption Euler equation
The second equation in (1) can be expressed in its no-Ponzi form as lim t!1 e Rt k t = 0, or, by the …rst equation in (1), lim t!1 e t u 0 (c c t )k t = 0. The worker inelastically supplies a ‡ow of one unit of labor and immediately consumes all wages and transfers due to the lack of access to the capital market. So the worker is a passive actor who makes no decisions. The instantaneous utility function is v(c w t ). The worker's consumption (and income) is c w t = w t +TR t where w t is the wage and TR t is the transfer. The assumptions that were imposed on the capitalist's utility function u are also imposed on v.
The …rm is a price taking pro…t maximizer with constant returns to scale in labor and capital. The production function in intensive form is f (k t ). The capital to labor ratio coincides with the capital stock since the labor supply is always one unit. We assume that f (0) = 0 and that f satis…es the same conditions as the utility functions u and v. At the …rm's optimum, f 0 (k t ) = r t and f (k t ) k t f 0 (k t ) = w t .
Given the restriction against government debt, tax revenue must equal the transfer at each instant:
Hence, from the de…nition of r t and the …rm's pro…t maximization condition, TR t =
In equilibrium, consumption plus investment must equal output:
, which is satis…ed by the capitalist's ‡ow budget constraint (Walras'Law).
Optimal taxation
The government maximizes social welfare
]dt subject to the equilibrium conditions: the capitalist maximizes lifetime utility, the worker consumes all available income, …rms maximize pro…ts, the government's budget is in balance at every instant so the worker's income is as described in (2), and markets clear. Note that the government applies the capitalist's discount factor to both consumers, and the welfare weight is time invariant. There is one further constraint: r t 0. This is a policy restriction that prevents the government from imposing a tax rate in excess of 100 percent. And there are two further assumptions implicit in the analysis of Judd (1985) :
The initial stock of capital satis…es f (k 0 ) k 0 > 0. Without this, the worker's initial consumption in (2) would not be positive.
The policy r t 0 does not solve the optimal taxation problem. This requires some background. In nonlinear programming the Fritz John necessary conditions allow for the possibility that the Lagrange multiplier of the objective function equals zero. But if a constraint quali…cation is satis…ed this Lagrange multiplier can be set equal to one and we get the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions. For optimal control we follow Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, p. 86 ) and say that a solution to the Pontryagin necessary conditions is abnormal if the multiplier of the objective function equals zero. For the optimal taxation problem here, the appendix shows that the only abnormal solution is r t 0. If this is not optimal (by assumption) then any time path that is optimal must be a normal solution. I.e., the multiplier of the objective function is not zero, and it can be set equal to one by normalization, as we do below.
One may feel uncomfortable with the assumption that r t 0 is not optimal. It would be better not to impose an assumption on an endogenous policy variable. The appendix provides two assumptions on the model's primitives (initial conditions, utility functions, etc) under which we can prove that r t 0
is not optimal. Unfortunately the derivation is quite tedious.
Substitute for c w t from (2) to get the following problem:
with k 0 > 0 given and lim t!1 e t u 0 (c c t )k t = 0. The optimal time path for the tax rate can be recovered from the de…nition of r t := (1 kt )(r t ) with r t = f 0 (k t ). The current value Hamiltonian is
The state variables are k t (with co-state q 1t ) and c c t (with co-state q 2t ), r t is the control, and t is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint r t 0. The following conditions are necessary for optimality:
together with the problem's two boundary conditions. The last line includes the complementary slackness and transversality conditions. 
In Lansing's example, u = log. Then (1) simpli…es to c The appendix provides a derivation of these necessary conditions. For a …nite time horizon T , the transversality conditions would be q 20 = q 2T = 0. With an in…nite time horizon, q 20 = 0 continues to be necessary for optimality. Regarding the necessity of the transversality condition at in…nity (TVC1) for continuous time models, see Halkin (1974) for an early treatment. Kamihigashi (2001) generalizes much of the previous literature on this topic. However, Kamihigashi's (2001) results are not applicable to the optimal taxation problem here. In particular, if we express the problem here in reduced form, the constraint set for (kt; c c t ; _ kt; _ c c t ) has an empty interior, and this violates assumption 3.1 of Kamihigashi (2001) . The TVC1 may still be necessary for optimality, but we cannot use Kamihigashi's (2001) theorem to reach this conclusion. Fortunately this has no bearing on the main results here. Judd's theorem, Lansing's theorem, and theorem 3.6 below remain true whether or not the TVC1 is included among the necessary conditions. 4 See theorem 2 and equations (24) on page 72 of Judd (1985) . 5 The assumption that limt!1 t exists does not always imply limt!1 _ t = 0 (e.g., t 1 sin t 2 ). However, this is not a problem here. Equations (3a, d, e) are of the form _ t = G(kt; c c t ; rt; q 1t ) with G continuous, where _ t represents _ q 1t , _ kt, or _ c c t . Therefore, under stated assumptions, _ t has a limit as t tends to in…nity. That limit must be zero; otherwise t (no dot) would fail to converge as t tends to in…nity. A similar argument can be applied to Lansing's theorem, and to parts of theorem 3.6, below. this and u = log into (3) to get:
This system characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. One of the properties of (4) is that generically lim t!1 (k t ; c c t ; r t ; q 1t ) does not exist. I.e., it may be that some of these variables converge, but in general they cannot all converge. Thus, for this special utility function the hypotheses of Judd's theorem generically cannot be satis…ed. The reason is as follows. If all these variables were to converge, the proof of Judd's theorem would apply so in the limit r = (hence = 0) and f 0 (k) = + . The latter condition would uniquely determine k (modi…ed golden rule). Then, from (4c), q 2t would converge and its limit would satisfy v 0 (c w ) = q 1 + q 2 . Also, in the limit, (4b) would yield (1 )=( k) = q 1 + q 2 .
where the last equality uses (2) . This would impose a second condition on k, in addition to f 0 (k) = + . Only in exceptional cases will the same value of k satisfy both these conditions. Generically there will be no k that satis…es both. Nonetheless, (4) is still valid -it still characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. The fact that (generically)
its variables do not all converge is neither here nor there.
Given the simpli…cations associated with u = log, Lansing states directly the optimal tax problem for this special case:
with k 0 > 0 given. The _ c c t equation is dropped because it is redundant. Thus the _ k t equation has a dual role.
Not only is it the capital accumulation equation; it is also the consumption Euler equation for the capitalist.
The current value Hamiltonian is H(k; r; q 3 ;
The following conditions are necessary for optimality:
with k 0 > 0 given. In Lansing (1999), this appears as (21) on page 435. Note the new notation q 3t for the co-state here in (5) . Since the _ k t equation has a dual role here so does its co-state. 6 Indeed q 3t is distinct from both of the co-states in (4), q 1t (for capital) and q 2t (for the capitalist's consumption). However, they are related to one another.
Lemma
Let u = log. Equations (4) and (5) are equivalent, with
Proof First, given a solution to (4), verify that (5) is satis…ed when q 3t is de…ned by (6) . From (4a),
So (5a) is satis…ed. Clearly (5b) follows from (4c), (5c) follows from (4d), and (5d) follows from (4f). This completes the veri…cation of (5).
Next, given a solution to (5), verify that (4) is satis…ed when q 1t and q 2t are de…ned by (7) and (8) . Take the time derivative of (7):
Substitute for _ k t from (5c) and substitute for _ q 3t from (5a):
Simplify and divide by k t > 0 to get (4a). Take the time derivative of (8):
Substitute for _ k t from (5c). We can also substitute for k t q 3t : take (7) and add to it times (8) to get
. After these substitutions we have
Divide by k t > 0 to get (4b). Since we have just shown that (7) and (8) yield
(4c) follows from (5b). Clearly, (4d) and (4e) follow from (5c). Finally, (4f) follows from (5d) and (8) . In particular, (8) yields q 20 = 0. 
Theorem (Lansing)
8 Let u = log. Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that k t , r t , and q 3t converge as t tends to in…nity, with strictly positive limits for k t , c w t , and f 0 (k t ) . Then, dropping the time subscripts to denote limiting values,
Judd's hypotheses are more restrictive than Lansing's. That is, in (4) Judd's hypotheses are that k t , c c t , r t , and q 1t all converge. Recall that generically this does not happen, but when it does, (1 )
So in this special case Lansing's theorem yields k = 0 in the limit, just like Judd's theorem: When u = log, Judd's theorem is a special (and exceptional) case of Lansing's.
Furthermore, when Judd's hypotheses are satis…ed, q 2t also converges by (4c). Hence, by (6), q 3t converges in (5). So Lansing's hypotheses are satis…ed. I.e., when u = log Judd's hypotheses imply Lansing's hypotheses. The converse does not necessarily hold. It is possible for q 3t to converge while q 1t and q 2t diverge. The following corollary states this formally. 7 With u = log, the lemma's equivalence result has the following consequence. In (4), q 1t and q 2t a¤ect the real allocation only through the value of q 1t + q 2t . Hence, at any time t > 0 we can reset the value of q 2t to zero and reset the value of q 1t to lim s"t (q 1s + q 2s ). Thereafter, the future evolution of q 1 follows (4a) and q 2 follows (4b) and so the future values of q 1 + q 2 are exactly as they were before the change. This has no e¤ect on the real allocation. The ability to reset q 2t to zero at any point in time, without real consequence, tells us the optimal taxation problem is dynamically consistent when u = log.
8 See proposition 2 on page 435 of Lansing (1999). 9 For some intuition, since u = log and c c = k, the result here can be expressed as sgn( k ) = sgn v 0 (c w ) (1 )u 0 (c c ) : redistribution goes in favor of the consumer with the larger welfare-weighted marginal utility of consumption.
Corollary
Let u = log. Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that k t , r t , and q 3t converge as t tends to in…nity, with strictly positive limits for k t , c w t , and f 0 (k t ) . Then, in (4),
where k = lim t!1 k t , etc. So if v 0 (c w )k 6 = 1 then both q 1t and q 2t fail to converge. Since sgn( k ) = sgn v 0 (c w )k 1 + from theorem 3:3, it follows that if k 6 = 0 then q 1t fails to converge so Judd's hypotheses are not satis…ed.
Proof In (7) and (8), apply l'Hopital's rule to the integrals divided by t, and use q 3 = v 0 (c w ) from the proof of theorem 3.3.
The following example rigs the initial conditions and parameter values to illustrate the corollary.
Example
Then the following solves (5): (9), q 1t and q 2t do not converge. The tax rate on capital income is not zero:
Return now to the general case (3) when the capitalist's utility is not necessarily u = log. As stated in the introduction, the focus of attention is time paths for which the observables k t , c c t , r t converge to positive limits as t tends to in…nity. Thus, for t su¢ ciently large the observables are approximately time invariant. To gain some insight we will temporarily take this approximation to the extreme: suppose that for all t T , (k t ; c c t ; r t ) (k; c c ; r). Although a time invariant path does not in general solve the optimal taxation problem, we will use this approximate solution to derive some implications. This will shed light on the limiting behavior as t ! 1 for the true optimum which we will then analyze rigorously in theorem 3.6.
If a solution to (3) were to satisfy (k t ; c c t ; r t ) (k; c c ; r) for all t T with c c > 0 and k > 0, then r = from (3e) and c c = k from (3d). Also for all t T , c w t
All that remains is (3b), which reduces to (1 )u 0 ( k) q 1t = q 2t _ q 2t for all t T . With the above solutions for q 1t and q 2t this requires that the coe¢ cients of t match up:
The solution to (10a) and (10b) requires one of the following alternatives:
In each of these, the …rst condition ensures that (10a) is satis…ed, while the second ensures that (10b) is satis…ed. In particular, in (i) the second condition allows us to …nd a unique value for q 1T that satis…es (10b).
In (i), the capital tax is zero whereas in (ii), the capital tax is not restricted to be zero. Lansing's example with u = log is an instance of alternative (ii): the …rst condition in (ii) is satis…ed identically and the second condition determines the value of k. (I.e., it determines the value of k that would lead to a time invariant path.) When u 6 = log, alternative (ii) would impose two distinct restrictions on k making it unlikely to have any solution. Thus, other than u = log, alternative (ii) can be e¤ectively dismissed and this leaves us with alternative (i) -zero tax on capital income.
These results for the time invariant approximation lead us to the following theorem for the limiting behavior of the optimality conditions (3).
Theorem
Suppose a solution to (3) has the property that k t , c c Proof Use (3a) to substitute for _ q 1t and use (3e) to substitute for _ c c t to get the following:
Then from the mean value theorem, for all t T there exists s 2 [T; t] such that
Under the convergence hypotheses, we can choose T su¢ ciently large so that
is arbitrarily close to
. Now consider the limiting behavior of q 2t . Since lim t!1 r t = from (3e), we have t = 0 for all t su¢ ciently large from (3f). Then from (3c),
Since the limit of a product is the product of the limits, we can summarize our results thus far:
Use
Integrate over [t; 1) and use the previous result that q 2t = O(t) as t ! 1:
In preparation for applying integration by parts to (13), let
1 . This will be useful later. From (11),
We can now express (13) as follows after applying integration by parts to the right side:
The second line follows from the limiting behavior of z t and from q 1t = O(t) as t ! 1. Use this equation
As t tends to in…nity, all terms on the right side of this equation converge. In particular, l'Hopital's rule can be applied to the integral divided by e t , while as shown previously t = 0 for all t su¢ ciently large. Furthermore, the term in square brackets on the left side converges. There are two possible cases:
In case (i), (14) reveals that q 1t converges as t ! 1 so Judd's theorem applies and lim t!1 kt = 0. In case (ii),
where the second equality uses lim t!1 c c t = lim t!1 k t from (3d, e), and also the earlier result regarding the limiting behavior of z t .
Remark
Consider the following cases of the theorem. If u = log, then in the proof z t = e t = and c c t = k t , so, dropping time subscripts to denote limiting values, in the limit (14) yields:
Conclusion
This paper has clari…ed the relationship between the results of Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999). Judd's theorem states that in steady state the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. 10 Lansing identi…es a logarithmic example of one of Judd's models in which this tax rate can converge to any number, zero or otherwise -the value depends on the model's primitives (the worker's utility function, the production func- 
Appendix
This appendix contains material on the following: the e¤ect of interest rates on savings; when can the …rst best be decentralized as an equilibrium; necessary conditions for the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem; and could r t 0 be a solution to the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem.
The e¤ect of interest rates on savings
Consider a two period model in which a consumer chooses …rst period consumption c 1 and second period consumption c 2 to maximize u 1 (c 1 ) + u 2 (c 2 ) subject to the present value budget constraint c 1 + c 2 =R y 1 + y 2 =R. The per-period utility functions u 1 and u 2 are strictly increasing and strictly concave; is a subjective discount factor (which could have been subsumed in u 2 ); R is the gross after-tax interest rate; and y t is exogenous income in period t. Let y = y 1 + y 2 =R be present value income. The …rst order conditions 
When can the …rst best be decentralized as an equilibrium?
The …rst best problem for the model in section 2 is to choose fc 
The current value Hamiltonian is H(k; c c ; c
where is the co-state for k. The optimality conditions are
We can use the @H=@c c equation to eliminate and get the following equivalent conditions:
Suppose we have a solution to these …rst best conditions, denoted by asterisks, fc c t ; c w t ; k t g t 0 . Our task is to determine when this solution can be decentralized as an equilibrium. I.e., when can we …nd f r t g t 0 such that fc c t ; c w t ; k t ; r t g t 0 is a solution to
We have omitted the constraint r t 0 which was imposed on the government's optimal taxation problem.
Since the …rst best satis…es (15), we will satisfy (21) if and only if
Since the …rst best satis…es (17), and with r t as just de…ned, we will satisfy (20) if and only if
If the …rst best does indeed satisfy (24), and with r t de…ned by (23), then the …nal equilibrium condition, (19), is also satis…ed.
We conclude that the …rst best can be decentralized as an equilibrium if and only if it satis…es (24) for all t 0. There is no reason to expect it to satisfy this condition, so there is no reason to expect it to be decentralizable. However, when this does occur, the equilibrium after-tax interest rate in (23) equals the before-tax rate. Hence, the capital income tax rate is identically zero through all time.
Necessary conditions for the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem 11 As in section 3, the optimal taxation problem is as follows:
Let f( r t ; k t ; c c t )g t 0 be a solution to this problem. Then following Halkin (1974) we know that for all T > 0, f( r t ; k t ; c c t )g 0 t T is a solution to the following …nite horizon problem with clamped terminal state:
On the last line the terminal values of the state variables are clamped down at the time T values that solve the in…nite horizon problem. 12 We shall proceed to express this clamped terminal state problem in the form that appears in section 3 of chapter 2 of Fleming and Rishel (1975). 13 Unfortunately we need a slight change of notation. Fleming and Rishel (1975) use the symbol u for the control, while the optimal taxation problem already uses u for the capitalist's utility function. So we will replace Fleming and Rishel's (1975) u(t) with r t or r(t) which is the control in the main text of the paper. Also, Fleming and Rishel (1975) use the symbol f in the equation of motion for the state of the system, while the optimal taxation problem already uses f for the production function in intensive form. So we will replace Fleming and Rishel's (1975) f with F . 1 1 Necessary conditions for the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem are similar. Where the derivation di¤ers, this will be indicated with footnotes. 1 2 In the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, the capitalist faces the constraint k T 0. This is the …nite horizon equivalent to the in…nite horizon no-Ponzi condition. The utility maximizing capitalist chooses k T = 0. So in this case the government's optimal taxation problem is almost identical to the clamped terminal state problem except that the boundary conditions are k 0 > 0 given and k T = 0, with c c T unconstrained. The state of the system at time t is 0 B @
I.e., we are introducing a new component of the state, x 3 (t). The equation of motion is _ x(t) = F t; x(t); r(t)
where
So _ x 3 is equal to the third component of F , and we can integrate to get
Compare this with the welfare objective in the optimal taxation problem with clamped terminal state. If we start the system at the …xed time t 0 = 0 and end it at the …xed time t 1 = T , then the performance index which we seek to minimize is the negative of welfare:
The end conditions are 2 ( ) = 3 ( ) = 4 ( ) = 5 ( ) = 6 ( ) = 0 where
Since x(t 0 ) and x(t 1 ) are 3-tuples, is a function from R 8 to R 6 . The closed control set U , introduced on the last line of page 23 of Fleming and Rishel (1975) , is taken to be U = [0; 1). This captures the constraint r t 0. and there exists a function P :
where x1 is the partial derivative of with respect to the arguments of x(t 1 ), and similarly for x0 . This notation x1 is not ideal since x 1 refers to a 3-tuple here whereas x 1 also refers to the …rst state variable, a scalar. Below, the meaning of x 1 should be clear from the context. In what follows, we drop the asterisks.
We now proceed to re-write these necessary conditions, using the optimal taxation problem's x, F , and
. From the de…nition of F above we have that F x (t; x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; r) is equal to
Hence the third component of the adjoint equations yields _ P 3 (t) 0, so P 3 (t) is a constant which we will simply denote P 3 . Then the other two adjoint equations can be written as follows, using the de…nition of x and using the end conditions t 0 = t 1 T = 0:
With U = [0; 1), the maximum principle states that r t must solve
We can disregard the terms that do not involve r. Then r t must solve
The …rst order necessary condition for this problem is
where t is a Lagrange multiplier.
We now use the de…nition of to evaluate its derivative: 
Substitute into the transversality conditions to get the following, where we use the result above that P 3 is a constant:
The last transversality condition is the only place where 2 appears so this equation serves as the de…nition of 2 but plays no other role in the solution to the optimal taxation problem. Similarly, the penultimate transversality condition de…nes 3 but plays no other role. The other transversality conditions de…ne 4 = P 1 (0), 5 = P 1 (T ), and 6 = P 2 (T ). We also have 1 = P 3 . Recall from the statement of the Pontryagin necessary conditions that 1 0. Thus, the transversality conditions provide us with the following information:
By way of contradiction, suppose (P 1 (0); P 3 ) = (0; 0). Then, together with the transversality condition P 2 (0) = 0, the unique solution to the di¤erential equations (25) and (26) is P 1 (t) 0 and P 2 (t) 0. But then the transversality conditions yield 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 = 6 = 0 which is a violation of the 1 5 In the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, is a function from R 8 to R 5 . See footnote 14. In this case the derivative of would include only the …rst 5 rows shown here. Furthermore, the non-zero vector would have only 5 components, ( 1 ; : : : ; 5 ). 1 6 In the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, there is no sixth component of and there is no 6 . See footnote 15. So where 6 appears in the transversality conditions in the text, it would be replaced with 0 for the …nite horizon optimal taxation problem. In this case, the transversality conditions would provide us with the following information: P 2 (0) = P 2 (T ) = 0 & P 3 0. The necessary conditions for optimality would thus be this information together with (25), (26), and (27)/(28).
Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality. We conclude that the assumption (P 1 (0); P 3 ) = (0; 0) leads to a contradiction so, after a normalization, we have 17
In summary, if f( r t ; k t ; c c t )g t 0 solves the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem then it also solves the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem with clamped terminal state and hence there exists a function P : [0; T ] ! R 2 and there exists a number P 3 such that (25), (26), (27) 
3 ) = (P 1 (0); P 3 ). We have P 3 0 and k(P 1 (0); P 3 )k = 1 since, by (29), these conditions are satis…ed for all i. Similarly since P i 2 (0) = 0 for all i, if we de…ne P 2 (0) :
For t 2 [0; 1) consider the di¤erential equations (25), (26), and _ P 3 (t) 0 with initial conditions
3 ) as in the previous paragraph. It should be understood that where the control and state appear in these equations their values are the solution to the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem. Let P : [0; 1) ! R 3 denote the solution to these di¤erential equations with these initial conditions. Since solutions to di¤erential equations are continuous in initial conditions 18 and since
. Then by continuity, f(P 1 (t); P 2 (t))g t 0 and P 3 satisfy (27) and (28).
In summary, we have shown that if f( r t ; k t ; c c t )g t 0 solves the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem then there exists a function P : [0; 1) ! R 2 and there exists a number P 3 such that (25), (26), (27), (28), and (29) are satis…ed with [0; T ] replaced by [0; 1) and with (0; T ) replaced by (0; 1). That is: 1 7 In the …nite horizon (T ) optimal taxation problem, we have P 2 (0) = P 2 (T ) = 0 & P 3 0. See footnote 16. By way of contradiction, if P 3 = 0 the …rst order linear di¤erential equations (25) and (26) with boundary conditions P 2 (0) = P 2 (T ) = 0 would yield P 1 (t) 0 and P 2 (t) 0. But then the transversality conditions would yield 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 which would violate the Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality. Thus, it must be that P 3 > 0. r t solves max r 0
We now ask if the system (30) through (34) can have a solution in which P 3 = 0. If so, then P 1 (0) = 1 from (34), while (30) and (31) yield
If we integrate the second of these equations and use the boundary condition P 2 (0) = 0 from (34), we get
where the second equality uses the solution for P 1 (t) above. Substitute these solutions for P 1 (t) and P 2 (t),
together with the assumed P 3 = 0, into (33):
Since u 00 < 0 < u 0 and since the exponential function is strictly positive, the term in curly braces is strictly positive. Then since P 1 (0) = 1 from (34), it follows that (33) requires P 1 (0) = 1 and r t = 0 for all t > 0.
In summary, the assumption P 3 = 0 leads to the conclusion that the optimal control for the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem must be r t = 0 for all t > 0.
The contrapositive of the result from the previous paragraph is the following: if r t 0 does not solve the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem, then P 3 6 = 0, and hence from (34), P 3 > 0. 19 In this case we can let q 1t := eThen P 1 (t) = P 3 e t q 1t _ P 1 (t) = P 3 e t q 1t + P 3 e t _ q 1t P 2 (t) = P 3 e t q 2t _ P 2 (t) = P 3 e t q 2t + P 3 e t _ q 2t
Use these to substitute for P 1 (t), _ P 1 (t), P 2 (t), _ P 2 (t), and t in (30), (31), (32), (33), and (34). Then divide each of (30) through (34) by P 3 e t > 0 to get
The …rst two lines of these expressions coincide with (3a) and (3b) respectively. The penultimate line coincides with (3c) and the …rst part of (3f). The boundary condition q 20 = 0 on the last line here appears in (3f).
Could r t 0 be a solution to the in…nite horizon optimal taxation problem?
In section 3 we assumed the optimal time path for the after-tax net of depreciation interest rate is not r t 0.
By excluding r t 0 from consideration, we were able to use the normal Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality and exclude the abnormal case. However, proper analysis should not impose an assumption on the time path f r t g t 0 since it is endogenous to the optimal taxation problem. The purpose of this section is to show that under assumptions 1 and 2 below, r t 0 is not optimal. These two assumptions are stated in terms of primitives (initial conditions, utility functions, etc) and not in terms of endogenous variables.
Where the analysis brushes over some technical details, this will be pointed out in the presentation.
We begin with some intuition. Recall the government's welfare objective
Our …rst result will be that if the worker's welfare weight is zero, then r t 0 cannot be optimal. This is obvious. The capitalist is dependent on interest income. So when all welfare weight is on the capitalist it cannot be optimal to tax away all interest income. The more interesting case is > 0. The worker's equilibrium consumption is c w t = f (k t ) k t r t k t which is adversely a¤ected in the short run by an increase in r t . So if this short run e¤ect is dominant then perhaps it could be optimal to set r t 0. But in the longer run r t a¤ects capital accumulation via _ k t = r t k t c c t and capital a¤ects the worker's consumption: @c
In particular, relative to the r t 0 equilibrium, an increase in the capital stock is desirable for the worker if f 0 (k t ) > 0. Thus, relative to the r t 0 equilibrium, if (i) an increase in r t causes an increase in capital and if (ii) f 0 (k t ) > 0, then apparently the worker's longer run utility will improve if we increase r t above zero. If this longer run e¤ect is dominant then it would seem r t 0 is not optimal. This is indeed the case when conditions (i) and (ii) are formalized as assumptions 1 and 2 below.
We now turn to the analysis.
Let T 0 be given and let 0 be given. Consider the following time path:
All results in this section are based on this family of variations, parametrized by T and . Note that = 0 yields r t 0, the object of study here. If, within this family of variations, = 0 is not optimal for the optimal taxation problem, then surely r t 0 does not solve the optimal taxation problem more generally.
With this parametrized time path for f r t g t 0 , cumulative interest is then
The equilibrium is as follows. The solution to the capitalist's utility maximization problem is given by (1): e t u 0 (c 
Social welfare is W ( ; T ) :
]dt where the consumption levels are evaluated at the ( ; T ) equilibrium. The government faces the policy constraint r t 0. Thus if there exists T such that W (0; T ) > 0, then r t 0 cannot solve the optimal taxation problem. Our goal for the remainder of this section is to evaluate the partial derivative W (0; T ) and show that it is positive for su¢ ciently large T when assumptions 1 and 2 below are satis…ed. We do not use the Laplace transform method of Judd (1985) since the baseline = 0 equilibrium is not in steady state.
Assuming we can di¤erentiate under the integral sign and all integrals converge, W is given by
where the second line uses the capitalist's …rst order condition as presented above.
We now proceed to di¤erentiate each of the equilibrium equations with respect to . We again assume di¤erentiation under the integral sign is justi…ed and all integrals converge: 
Since the goal is to determine the sign of W ( ; T ) at = 0, we now evaluate these equilibrium derivatives at = 0, in which case e (t T ) = e (s T ) = 1. Hence, 
This gives a …rst result which, as mentioned in this section's introductory remarks, is intuitively obvious:
If the worker's welfare weight is zero, i.e., = 0, then W (0; T ) > 0 for all T and so r t 0 cannot solve the optimal taxation problem.
We now consider the case > 0. Use the equilibrium derivatives to substitute for (@k t =@ )j =0 in formula (37) for W (0; T ): 
For the remainder of this section we make two assumptions:
Assumption 1 Either the capitalist's utility function is u = log, or else lim c!0 cu 00 (c)=u 0 (c) 2 ( 1; 0).
For the latter alternative, the assumption is that this limit exists and is strictly between 1 and zero.
This is satis…ed by, among many others, u(c) = (c 1 1=
1)=(1 1= ) with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution > 1.
If u = log we have c + u 0 (c)=u 00 (c) 0, so not only does (36) yield (@c c 0 =@ )j =0 = 0 thereby causing the …rst line of (38) to equal zero, but also the third line of (38) equals zero too. Alternatively, if lim c!0 cu 00 (c)=u 0 (c) 2 ( 1; 0) then c + u 0 (c)=u 00 (c) < 0 for all c su¢ ciently small. In this case, we will
show that the sum of the …rst and third lines of (38) is positive if T is su¢ ciently large. Note, from the section earlier in this appendix entitled "The e¤ect of interest rates on savings," savings (and hence capital) are an increasing function of the interest rate if future consumption satis…es c+u 0 (c)=u 00 (c) < 0.
In e¤ect, we are assuming that an increase in r t causes an increase in capital.
Assumption 2 The initial stock of capital satis…es f 0 (k 0 ) 0.
That is, at the beginning of time the pre-tax net of depreciation interest rate is not negative. It then increases monotonically as time proceeds since, with = 0, capital evolves according to _ k t = c c t so capital declines monotonically and its marginal product rises monotonically. The assumption here is stronger than section 3's f (k 0 ) k 0 > 0.
We now consider lim c!0 cu 00 (c)=u 0 (c) 2 ( 1; 0) from the …rst assumption, and hence c + u 0 (c)=u 00 (c) < 0 for all c su¢ ciently small. We shall show that the sum of the …rst and third lines of (38) 
where we have used the following: c w t = f (k t ) k t when = 0; f 0 (k t ) > 0 under our assumptions; and _ k t < 0 when = 0. Thus the integrand on the fourth line of (40) has an absolute value less than one. (From the de…nition of S(T ), the term in square brackets in the integrand has a value between negative one and zero.) Noting the range of integration, we conclude that the fourth line of (40) is negative with an absolute value less than S(T ).
In preparation for analysis of the …fth line of (40), note that with = 0, l'Hopital's rule and the equilibrium laws of motion (3d,e) yield lim T !1
